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Abstract
The present paper provides first empirical evidence on the relationship between market size and the number of firms in the 
healthcare industry for a transition economy. We estimate market-size thresholds required to support different numbers of 
suppliers (firms) for three occupations in the healthcare industry in a large number of distinct geographic markets in Slovakia, 
taking into account the spatial interaction between local markets. The empirical analysis is carried out for three time periods 
(1995, 2001 and 2010) which characterise different stages of the transition process. Our results suggest that the relationship 
between market size and the number of firms differs both across industries and across periods. In particular, we find that 
pharmacies, as the only completely liberalised market in our dataset, experience the largest change in competitive behaviour 
during the transition process. Furthermore, we find evidence for correlation in entry decisions across administrative borders, 
suggesting that future market analysis should aim to capture these regional effects.
Keywords Health care · Entry models · Competition · Regulation · Transition economies
JEL Classification I11 · I18 · L22 · D22
Introduction
Health systems in OECD countries have seen a steady 
increase in health spending over the last 50 years. Expendi-
ture in this sector has tended to grow at a faster rate than 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While health spend-
ing accounted for less than 4% of GDP on average across 
OECD countries in 1960, this share increased to 8.9% in 
2013 [1]. The health spending share of the GDP grew par-
ticularly rapidly in the United States, rising from about 5% 
in 1960 to 16.4% in 2013. A similar tendency can be seen 
in Central European countries, where healthcare services 
today represent one of the most important sectors of the 
modern economy (with 11.0% of GDP in Germany, 10.1% 
in Austria, 7.6% in the Slovak Republic and 7.1% in the 
Czech Republic, for instance). The size of these industries 
and their long-run trends suggest that understanding their 
structure, conduct and performance is important not only 
for the performance of the healthcare industry, but also for 
understanding the economy as a whole.
The present paper is based on, and extends, an approach 
pioneered by Bresnahan and Reiss [2]. According to Bresna-
han and Reiss [2], the relationship between market structure 
(i.e., the number of firms) and market size (e.g., population) 
speaks to the nature and intensity of competition between 
firms. This approach uses a simple, general entry condition 
to model market structure. It postulates that if the population 
(per-firm) required to support a given number of firms in a 
market grows with the number of firms, then competition 
must be getting tougher. Intense competition reduces profit 
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margins. A larger population is, thus, necessary for generat-
ing sales required to cover entry costs.1 Thus, the key data 
required for applying the Bresnahan–Reiss (entry-threshold) 
approach are both minimal and commonly available: market 
structure (i.e., the number of firms) and population in several 
local markets.
Note, however, that the entry-threshold approach assumes 
local markets to be fully isolated. The equilibrium in one 
market must be independent—in terms of demand and com-
petition—of other markets. While this might be a plausible 
assumption in some sparsely populated (rural) regions,2 the 
high population density in many European countries raises 
doubts concerning the assumption of perfectly isolated 
regional markets. Aguirregabiria and Suzuki [4] conclude: 
’Focusing on rural areas makes the approach impractical 
for many interesting retail industries that are predominantly 
urban’ (p.  26). Spatial spillover effects between differ-
ent regions might be particularly important for healthcare 
industries, since the costs of travelling are small relative 
to the value of the service. Consumers might thus be will-
ing to travel larger distances to patronise a specific service 
provider. The present paper aims at extending the entry-
threshold approach by modelling spatial interaction effects 
explicitly.
The second novel feature of this paper is that we will pro-
vide first empirical evidence on (changes of) market conduct 
and competition in the healthcare industry of a transition 
economy (the Slovak Republic). The structure of a planned 
economy as well as the behaviour of firms (or production 
units) in this environment differs from the structure and 
conduct of firms in a market economy in many dimensions 
[5]. Given the very specific structure of a centrally planned 
economy, as well as the significant economic and institu-
tional changes during the process of transition, an empiri-
cal analysis can provide novel insights into the evolution of 
market structure and firm conduct in the healthcare industry 
for a transition economy.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section pro-
vides a short overview of the existing empirical literature. 
This is followed by a section reviewing the relevant changes 
in the economic environment in Slovakia. Subsequently, 
the data and empirical framework are presented. The sec-
tion “Entry threshold analysis” discusses the changes in 
competitive behaviour across periods. This is followed by 
a section detailing counterfactual scenarios, both in terms 
of regulatory frameworks and in terms of overall economic 
conditions. The paper concludes with a summary of the main 
findings and proposes possible extensions of the research 
agenda.
Literature review
Given the increasing significance of the healthcare sector, 
it is not surprising to find a large number of empirical stud-
ies analysing the determinants of market structure (i.e., the 
location and the number of suppliers in a specific market) 
as well as the effects of market structure on competition and 
economic performance.3 A substantial share of this literature 
focuses on the relationship between market size (popula-
tion) and the number of suppliers (firms) in different local 
markets.
The relationship between population and market structure 
(number of suppliers) for the market of physicians was first 
investigated empirically by Newhouse et al. [7], who found 
that the size of a town affects the probability of a physician 
being located there. They also make use of the fact that the 
number of specialists in the U.S. increased dramatically over 
the decade of the 1970s. Towns that did not previously have 
a specialist experienced a larger increase in the number of 
specialists than those that did.
Rosenthal et al. [8] revisit this issue using data from the 
1980s and 1990s. They examine 23 states with low physi-
cian to population ratios. The total number of physicians 
in these states doubled from 1970 to 1999. They find that 
communities of all sizes gained physicians over this period, 
but growth rates were larger for smaller communities. A 
recent paper by Isabel and Paula [9] examines some of these 
issues using data for Portugal from 1996 and 2007. Over 
this period, the total number of physicians in Portugal grew 
by approximately 30% and the number per capita grew by 
approximately 22%. They estimate a static model using 2007 
data and find that population size has a large and significant 
impact on the number of physicians per capita located in an 
area. They also test a dynamic model and find that areas that 
had more physicians per capita in 1996 had lower growth 
in the number of physicians per capita. This is consistent 
with the results reported in Newhouse et al. [7]. Brown [10] 
also confirms this relationship for the Canadian province 
of Alberta, although the evidence is not overwhelming. A 
study by Dionne et al. [11] also found this to be true for the 
province of Quebec, Canada.
A recent paper by Schaumans and Verboven [12] exam-
ines the determinants of entry in physician service markets 
in Belgium. A novel feature of this study is that the authors 
1 For example, if the size of the market needs to triple to add an addi-
tional entrant, this suggests that the addition of that firm dramatically 
reduces firm profits. A discussion of the importance and the effects of 
competition in the healthcare industries can be found in Barros et al. 
[3].
2 Bresnahan and Reiss [2] identify towns or small cities in the con-
tinental United States that are at least 20 miles from the nearest town 
of 1000 people or more to estimate their econometric models.
3 A comprehensive survey of this literature is available in Gaynor 
and Town [6].
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consider the entry decisions of pharmacies simultaneously 
with those of other professions. Pharmacies and physician 
practices provide complementary services. Consequently, 
each type of firm benefits from the presence of the other. 
Both prescription drug prices and physician service prices 
are heavily regulated in Belgium. Therefore, both pharma-
cies and physician practices engage in non-price competi-
tion (convenience, quality of service, quality of care, etc.). 
While the entry of physicians into local markets is free from 
restriction, pharmacy entry is regulated: there is a maximum 
number of pharmacies allowed in an area, based on the local 
population. Schaumans and Verboven adapt the models of 
Bresnahan and Reiss [2] and Mazzeo [13] to allow for entry 
restrictions for pharmacies as well as the fact that products 
sold by the two types of firms (pharmacies and physicians) 
may be strategic complements. They find that the population 
necessary to support a given number of firms increases more 
or less proportionally with the number of firms. According 
to Bresnahan and Reiss [2], this implies that entry does not 
lead to tougher competition. These results suggest that phar-
macies and physicians do not engage in more intense price 
competition as more firms of their own type enter a market. 
The authors also find that the population necessary to sup-
port another physician practice decreases with the number 
of pharmacies, and vice versa. This supports the hypothesis 
of strategic complementarities. Schaumans and Verboven 
then use the parameter estimates from the model to simulate 
the impacts of policy reform in the pharmacy market. They 
consider easing entry restrictions by increasing the maxi-
mum number of pharmacies allowed in an area, and reduc-
ing pharmacies’ regulated markups. They find that simply 
allowing free entry (no change in markups) would increase 
the number of pharmacies by 173%. The complementarities 
between pharmacies and physician practices lead to a 7% 
increase in the number of physician practices as a result of 
the entry liberalization for pharmacies.
Abraham et al. [14] specify a static entry model modi-
fied from Bresnahan and Reiss [2] to better understand 
the nature of competition for hospitals. They augment the 
Bresnahan–Reiss approach by quantity data. Their method 
allows the separate identification of changes in the fixed 
costs of entry and changes in the toughness of competition. 
Their estimates imply that the threshold per-firm popula-
tion required to support one hospital is approximately 7000, 
increases to 12,600 to support two hospitals, is approxi-
mately 19,000 for three hospitals, and just under 20,000 
for four or more hospitals. They also find that a rise in the 
number of hospitals in the market dramatically increases 
the number of patients up until there are three hospitals, 
by 23% with the entry of the second hospital and 15% with 
the entry of the third hospital. This implies a substantial 
increase in the toughness of competition with the entry of a 
second or third firm, but not thereafter. These results point to 
considerable effects on competition, even from having only 
a second firm enter the market. However, the magnitude of 
the effects (23% increase in quantity associated with mov-
ing from a monopoly to a duopoly) seems extremely large.
Note that the existing empirical literature considers mar-
ket structure and competition in developed market econo-
mies only. Similar microlevel studies for transition econo-
mies are lacking. In view of the series of structural changes 
inherent in transition process, a close examination of the 
process is likely to contribute to a better understanding of 
how healthcare providers react to adjustments in the eco-
nomic climate (both in terms of changes in demand char-
acteristics, and in terms of remuneration schemes and gen-
eral regulatory conditions). The following section provides 
a short description of structural changes in the healthcare 
sector in Slovakia during the transition period.
Transition of the healthcare system 
in Slovakia
The transition process in Slovakia has included a number of 
changes to the regulatory environment of healthcare profes-
sions. An overview of the main regulatory changes is pro-
vided in Table 1.
Slovakia4 entered the transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy as a part of Czechoslova-
kia. Until 1989, the regulatory framework did not allow 
independent decisions of firms on prices; free entry and 
exit was impossible, and the entire production process 
was governed by central and regional governmental units 
and state-owned institutions. The state was responsible for 
healthcare coverage and took full responsibility for financ-
ing (through general taxation), planning, management and 
provision of healthcare. Basic services were granted free of 
charge to all citizens. The pre-1945 social insurance system 
was abolished. All healthcare providers were nationalised 
and incorporated into Regional and District Institutes of 
National Health. Regional Institutes consisted of regional 
healthcare centers (large hospitals). The  District Institutes 
of National Health consisted of small- or medium-sized 
hospitals and polyclinics, along with pharmacies, centers 
of hygiene, emergency, first aid services and nurseries. The 
centrally planned economy and healthcare system led to inef-
ficiencies and inaccurate resource allocation decisions. The 
system was not able to deal with the growing incidence of 
lifestyle diseases and hospitals were equipped with outdated 
4 This section is based on the Health Systems in Transition report for 
Slovakia by Szalay et al. [15], which provides a detailed description 
of the healthcare system and of reforms in the Slovak Republic. It 
was prepared by national experts in collaboration with the European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
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technology. The lack of improvements in technology was 
compensated for by increasing numbers of health workers 
and hospital beds, which resulted in a healthcare system with 
a surplus of ambulatory physicians.
A social insurance system (based on the Bismarck sys-
tem) was reintroduced after 1989. In 1993, Slovakia gained 
independence and the National Insurance Fund was estab-
lished to fund health, social and pension insurance. Social 
health insurance was legally defined in 1994 by the Act on 
Health Insurance, which enabled the establishment of other 
health insurance funds. The reintroduction of social health 
insurance suffered from problems created during the previ-
ous regime and the macroeconomic environment that went 
along with the transformation process. The Slovak economy 
was in a deep recession and public finances were seriously 
constrained. This led to a situation in which the state did 
not have the capacity to make health insurance contribu-
tions for the inactive population. The health system that was 
based on a new institutional and regulatory framework with 
privatised healthcare providers was marked by weak budget 
constraints and corruption, which led to increasing debts 
and bankruptcies in the health insurance market. Hospitals 
remained technologically underdeveloped with an oversup-
ply of health personnel and ineffective management. Even 
though nearly all hospitals were owned by the state (they 
existed under the control of the Ministry of Health as state 
contributory organizations) during the 90s, most pharmacies 
and ambulatory physicians went into private practice. The 
hierarchical healthcare structure was broken down and the 
healthcare system became fragmented, with a high num-
ber of specialised healthcare providers. The functioning of 
the healthcare system became unsustainable and required 
another set of reforms.
The first set of institutional changes was introduced by 
the new government in the 1999–2002 period as part of 
a broader set of macroeconomic stabilization measures. 
However, the major problems were tackled only partially 
and the structural deformation of the system’s supply 
deepened. The state lost control of 14 healthcare facilities 
that were privatised and transformed to non-profit organi-
zations. The management was transferred to regional 
and local governments in most of the other state-owned 
Table 1  Overview of regulatory 
reforms in the Slovak healthcare 
sector. Source: Authors’ 
compilation based on Szalay 
et al. [15]
1990 Re-introduction of market principles and fragmentation of the system
Re-establishment of social health insurance
1993 Establishment of the National Health Insurance Fund
1995 Multiple health insurance funds allowed
General Health Insurance Fund and 12 other insurance funds established
Weak budget constraints and increasing debt in the system
Most pharmacies and ambulatory physicians went into private practice
1998 Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists has the right to approve the establishment of new pharmacies
Entry of pharmacies was not restricted by population or location explicitly
From centrally planned system to unsustainably fragmented system
1999 First stabilization measures aimed partially at the problems in the healthcare system
2000 Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists introduced demographic and location restrictions for pharmacies
2001 Decline in number of doctors due to restructuring of hospitals and migration abroad
Price regulation by the Ministry of Finance
2003 Key health care reforms
Stabilization measures - user fees
Restructuring of the debt in the system
2004 Establishment of Health Care Surveillance Authority (Act No 581/2004 Coll.)
Health insurance companies transformed to joint stock companies
Reform aimed at transparent entry and decrease of entry barriers
Abolition of entry restrictions in pharmacy markets
Liberalised ownership of pharmacies
Introduction of selective contracting
Hard budgetary constraints
2007 Refinements of the reforms
Some of the pro-market reforms were discarded by the new government
User fees were scaled down
Selective contracting was restricted
Key reform acts remained unchanged
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healthcare facilities (with the exception of the biggest 
hospitals and specialised institutions). This restructuring 
and the migration of doctors and nurses abroad led to a 
continuous fall in the number of physicians and nurses in 
relation to the population after 2001.
Key reforms to the healthcare system were introduced 
in the 2002–2006 period, with major legislative changes 
taking place in 2004. The health reform was based on a set 
of structural and functional changes which were supposed 
to transform the centralised system into a decentralised 
system; from the state as a provider of healthcare services 
to the state as a supervisor setting the “rules of the game”; 
from the hierarchical functional structure to a contrac-
tual structure; and from the state as a bearer of risk to a 
situation in which every player bears the risk (providers, 
patients, purchasers). The key objective of the reform was 
to increase the independence and financial responsibility 
of healthcare providers. During this period, hard budget 
constraints were introduced; health insurance companies 
were transformed into joint stock companies; the Health 
Care Surveillance Authority (HCSA) was established (to 
split the legislative and control function in the healthcare 
system); user fees were introduced; flexible prices, con-
tractual relations with selective contracting and flexible 
basic benefit packages were decentralised to health insur-
ance companies; a flexible healthcare network (with the 
definition of a minimum network) and drug policy meas-
ures accompanied by the liberalization of ownership of 
pharmacies were implemented. The reform aimed to make 
the process of entry into the healthcare provision market 
more transparent and to remove barriers to entry.
After the 2006 elections, some of the pro-market reforms 
were discarded (selective contracting was restricted, health 
insurance companies were no longer allowed to make a 
profit, user fees were scaled down or completely abolished), 
but key reform acts remained unchanged. A new government 
in 2010 reversed the trajectory of reforms again and declared 
plans to continue to bring new market mechanisms into the 
healthcare system.
As of 2010, the social health insurance system was based 
on solidarity, provided universal coverage for a broad range 
of benefits and guaranteed an annual free choice of one of 
three nationally operating health insurance companies (one 
of which was state-owned and covered 66% of the insured, 
and two privately owned). Pharmacies, diagnostic laborato-
ries and almost 90% of outpatient facilities were in private 
hands. Ambulatory care was provided mostly by privately 
organised physicians and people were free to choose their 
general practitioner and specialist. The system was adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Health, the HCSA and the self-gov-
erning regions which, besides other responsibilities, issued 
permits to healthcare providers. Chambers and professional 
associations kept registers of health professionals, issued 
opinions on ethical issues, issued or revoked licences and 
monitored the management of healthcare facilities.
For providers to enter the Slovak healthcare provision 
market, several criteria needed to be fulfilled. Healthcare 
professionals had to obtain a licence from the Slovak Medi-
cal Chamber and a permit from the self-governing region or 
the Ministry of Health (depending on what type of provider 
it was). Then, providers were supposed to submit a request 
for a contract with a health insurance company, although 
providers could also provide services without a contract 
with a health insurance company. A minimum network of 
providers was determined by the government which defined 
the density and structure of healthcare providers across Slo-
vakia. In primary care, general practitioners were entitled 
to a contract as soon as a patient registered with them. In 
ambulatory secondary care and in inpatient tertiary care, 
the minimum network was defined as a minimum number 
of specialists by type in each region. Health insurance com-
panies then had the option to contract more providers if they 
had enough resources. Certain state-owned hospitals which 
were deemed crucial in guaranteeing geographical accessi-
bility of specialised services were required to be contracted 
even if the quality and price did not match those of their 
competitors. Exit from the market was usually caused by 
the lack of contracts with health insurance companies and/
or resulting from a negative financial situation.
Dental care was provided either by contracted or non-con-
tracted dentists. But direct payments from patients for dental 
procedures were necessary in most cases even to contracted 
dentists, because social health insurance covered only basic 
dental costs (under the condition of regular preventive dental 
examination each calendar year).
Besides the described institutional changes, the pharmacy 
market in Slovakia was influenced by specific regulatory 
changes. Until 1998, it was regulated by the Act No. 13/1992 
on the Slovak Medical Chamber, the Slovak Chamber of 
Dentists and the Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists. The entry 
of new pharmacies was not explicitly regulated by demo-
graphic or population criteria, but the Slovak Chamber of 
Pharmacists had the right to comment on the request for 
establishment of a new pharmacy that had to be approved 
by the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic. A new 
Act No. 140/1998 from 1998 on drugs and medical facilities 
gave the Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists an explicit right to 
approve the request for establishment of new pharmacies in 
Slovakia. Without its approval, new pharmacies could not 
enter the market. Later, the Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists 
approved the directive on Declaration of professional and 
ethical competencies for the operation of pharmaceutical 
care in the public pharmacy [16], which explicitly intro-
duced demographic and population criteria for the establish-
ment of new pharmacies. The minimum distance between 
pharmacies was set to 500 m and the minimum population 
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per pharmacy was regulated to 5000 inhabitants. Based on 
several decisions of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slo-
vak Republic against the Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists 
[17–19], these restrictions were abolished. The ownership 
regulation changed in 2004. The revision of the Act on 
Drugs and medical facilities from 2004 (633/2004) allowed 
(after fulfilling some specific requirements) any individual 
or legal entity to own a pharmacy (only pharmacists could 
own a pharmacy previously). The liberalization of the phar-
macy market in 2002 and 2004 led to the entry of new phar-
macies thereafter.
Data and empirical framework
Data and descriptive evidence
The empirical analysis is based on data from between 2800 
and 2900 regional submarkets in Slovakia.5 Data charac-
terizing market conditions for pharmacies, physicians and 
dentists are collected on a local level for three time periods 
(1995, 2001, and 2010).
The number of sellers in each town is calculated using 
data from the “Register of Economic Subjects” of the Slovak 
Republic, which should cover all relevant firms. We identify 
firms as belonging to a particular group based on their main 
economic activity following the NACE Rev. 1 classifica-
tion of industries. The Register also provides information on 
the location of the sellers, which allows us to compute the 
equilibrium number of firms. Large towns may be divided 
into several submarkets based on ZIP codes. In total, there 
are 2843 (2897 and 2926) markets in 1995 (2001 and 2010).
Table 2 provides an overview of the observed market 
structures, as well as their frequency. As markets with more 
than seven firms are seldom observed, we pool them to 
increase the precision of the estimates. This approach is in 
line with previous applications of the methodology. 
The firm data are merged with market-level information 
on total population. Demographic variables are available at 
a highly disaggregated level. As can be seen from Fig. 1, the 
most common category of towns has a population of fewer 
than 500 inhabitants. This fine definition of the administra-
tive units allows us to measure variations in local charac-
teristics extremely precisely. The figure also illustrates the 
close relationship between population and the number of 
firms, suggesting that the number of inhabitants is a good 
measure of market size. 
To assess the level of market barriers and competitive 
effects more precisely, it is necessary to build a model which 
Table 2  Summary statistics for 
the number of firms in markets 
for professional services in 
1995, 2001, 2010
Number of firms Pharmacies Physicians Dentists
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Number of local markets
0 2469 2573 2555 2277 2206 2223 2391 2290 2410
1 258 220 214 237 234 315 296 361 290
2 60 38 54 154 186 171 55 71 69
3 6 19 23 52 82 56 20 25 31
4 18 10 10 17 39 28 10 19 16
5 6 12 9 18 18 15 10 11 19
6 4 4 10 15 11 12 9 10 12
≥ 7 22 21 51 73 121 106 52 72 79
Total 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926
Share of local markets with a particular number of firms in %
0 86.84 88.82 87.32 80.09 76.15 75.97 84.10 80.26 82.37
1 9.07 7.59 7.31 8.34 8.08 10.77 10.41 12.56 9.91
2 2.11 1.31 1.85 5.42 6.42 5.84 1.93 2.45 2.36
3 0.21 0.66 0.79 1.83 2.83 1.91 0.70 0.86 1.06
4 0.63 0.35 0.34 0.60 1.35 0.96 0.35 0.66 0.55
5 0.21 0.41 0.31 0.63 0.62 0.51 0.35 0.38 0.65
6 0.14 0.14 0.34 0.53 0.38 0.41 0.32 0.35 0.41
≥ 7 0.77 0.72 1.74 2.57 4.18 3.62 1.83 2.49 2.70
5 The fluctuation in the number of observations is due to changes in 
the definition of administrative units. These alterations are usually 
the product of towns growing larger and hence splitting into separate 
administrative units. MISR [20] and SOSR [21] provide additional 
information regarding the rationale behind these changes. As we 
expect these administrative decisions to reflect economic phenomena, 
we accept that split municipalities are likely to represent split mar-
kets.
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controls for additional municipal specifics, to reflect the fact 
that consumers differ in their per-capita level of demand. 
We, therefore, supplement population data with information 
on the share of young and senior citizens.6 These data, as 
well as the information on the total number of inhabitants, 
are taken from the “Urban and Municipal Statistics” and as 
such are provided at the most detailed level. Unfortunately, 
data on wages and unemployment rates are only available at 
the district level, as they come from the “Regional Statistics 
Database” of the Slovak Republic. We provide descriptive 
statistics for the variables in the Appendix.
Empirical framework
In line with previous work by Bresnahan and Reiss [2] and 
Schaumans and Verboven [22], we propose that healthcare 
providers within a given market have identical characteris-
tics. This implies that in a market with N competitors, the 
level of per-firm per-capita variable profits (v(N)) is the same 
for all firms. Furthermore, we assume that fixed costs (f) 
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Fig. 1  Relationship between population and the number of firms in a given municipality
Table 3  Spatial autocorrelation 
in firm numbers and market 
characteristics
Year 1995 2001 2010
Variable Moran’s I p-value Moran’s I p-value Moran’s I p-value
Firm numbers
Pharmacies 0.005 0.514 0.059 0.000 0.092 0.000
Physicians 0.015 0.040 0.043 0.000 0.089 0.000
Dentists 0.011 0.138 0.054 0.000 0.080 0.000
Market characteristics
Population 0.004 0.501 0.055 0.000 0.099 0.000
Wage 0.817 0.000 0.702 0.000 0.759 0.000
Unemployment 0.913 0.000 0.913 0.000 0.908 0.000
% Young 0.290 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.230 0.000
% Senior 0.278 0.000 0.279 0.000 0.259 0.000
6 We define young citizens as those who have not yet completed their 
fifteenth year and the elderly as anyone aged over 60.
 M. Lábaj et al.
1 3
are independent of the number of firms. Per-firm profits are 
given by 휋(N) = v(N)S − f  , where S represents the market 
size measured by population. In a market with free entry and 
N firms, revealed preference implies that:
or equivalently:
To estimate ln v(N)
f
 , we collect data on market characteristics 
(summarised in the matrix X), include firm-fixed effects ( 휃N ) 
and allow for random shocks in expected profitability via an 
unobservable error term 휀.
The model can then be estimated using an ordered probit 
specification for the number of firms in any given market 
(y)7:
The values of 휃N and 휃N+1 measure the changes in the vari-
able profits to fixed costs ratio which can be attributed to 
market structure. If the two parameters are significantly dif-
ferent from each other, one would conclude that market prof-
itability changes substantially with the entry of the N + 1 st 
competitor.
Note that estimating an ordered probit model on the num-
ber of firms in individual markets assumes that these mar-
kets are spatially isolated. While the assumption of spatially 
isolated submarkets might be plausible in Bresnahan and 
Reiss’ [2] empirical analysis,8 the high population density in 
many Western and Central European countries renders this 
assumption highly implausible.
A Moran’s I analysis (see Table  3) of our variables 
of interest also points to the presence of strong spatial 
𝜋N+1 = v(N + 1)S − f < 0 < v(N)S − f = 𝜋N
(1)ln
v(N + 1)
f
+ ln S < 0 < ln
v(N)
f
+ ln S.
(2)ln
v(N)
f
= X훽 − 휃N + 휀, 휀 ∼ N(0, 휎
2I).
y = N, if 𝜃N ≤ y
∗ < 𝜃N+1
y∗ = X𝛽 + ln S + 𝜀.
autocorrelation both in the number of firms and in the mar-
ket characteristics.9 Particularly for the last two periods, 
there is correlation in population measures, as certain hubs 
of economic activity are formed. This shows that similar 
markets are likely to cluster together and further suggests 
that unobserved characteristics are also likely to be corre-
lated across space. With this in mind, taking into account not 
only the level of the latent profitability in a given market, 
but also in adjacent administrative units, may improve the 
quality of inference. We therefore follow Lábaj et al. [24] by 
allowing for spatial autocorrelation across observations. As 
consumers are likely to demand healthcare services beyond 
the border of their municipality, we explicitly model inter-
actions across towns and hence implement a model which 
captures the characteristics of densely populated areas.
Spatial dependence is modelled using a spatial autocor-
related ordered probit model (see [25]), which presumes cor-
relation across latent profitability ( y∗):
We assume that consumers have a strong preference for 
healthcare providers which are close by and hence use a 
W matrix with an exponential specification and elements 
equal to wij = 1∕dist2ij , where distij is the distance between 
regions i and j. For estimation purposes, the matrix is also 
row-standardised.10
In the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the latent 
profitability measure, the data are assumed to follow a trun-
cated multivariate normal distribution:
y = N if 𝜃N < y
∗ < 𝜃N+1
(3)y∗ = 휌Wy∗ + X훽 + ln S + 휀, where 휀 ∼ N(0, 휎2I).
y∗ ∼ TMVN(휇,훺)
휇 = (I − 휌W)−1(X훽 + ln S)
훺 = [(I − 휌W)�(I − 휌W)]−1.
8 The authors study towns which are located at least 100 miles away 
from a large metropolitan area (with more than 100,000 inhabit-
ants) and are not closer than 20 miles to a town with a population of 
over 1000 people. In a more complex approach, Seim [23] allows for 
a more flexible definition of the market by using concentric circles 
around each seller. However, this increased flexibility is combined 
with the restriction that the competitive effect of additional entry is 
the same, regardless of the current number of incumbent firms. Addi-
tionally, information on the exact location of each seller is necessary, 
which is outside the scope of our dataset.
9 The Moran’s I statistic is calculated as:
where wij is equal to the inverse distance between town i and town j 
squared if those are within 30 km of each other and 0 otherwise. x̄ 
represents the average value of the variable, whereas xi(xj ) measures 
the variable at a given location i (j). n represents the total number of 
observations, whereas S0 counts the number of positive connections 
between the observations ( S0 =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1
wij ). The statistic measures 
the spatial correlation between the observations and compares this to 
a random distribution.
I =
n
S0
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1
wij(xi − x̄)(xj − x̄)
∑n
i=1
(xi − x̄)
2
10 We set wij = 0 if the towns are more than 30 km apart. This cut-
off value corresponds to Bresnahan and Reiss [2], who use a 20-mile 
threshold. Furthermore, the use of exponential weights means that 
towns which are further than 30 km away are unlikely to get a high 
weight. Estimation experiments with alternative cut-off values pro-
vide very similar empirical results.
7 In the description of the model below, the parameter of ln S is con-
strained to 1. In the estimation, this parameter is allowed to vary. It is 
denoted as 훼 in the reported results (Table 4) and can be interpreted 
as 1∕휎 (see [22, p. 204]). All parameters are subsequently rescaled in 
order to arrive at the values relevant for the theoretical model.
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Note that the theoretical interpretation of the spillover effects 
(measured by the parameter 휌 ) is ambiguous, since they 
measure the effect of a one-unit change in the estimated aver-
age neighbourhood profitability. This profitability (denoted 
by Wy∗ ) may rise due to two counteracting reasons: (1) if 
market characteristics improve (in other words 휇 grows) or 
(2) if more firms have entered the market (since y∗
N
< y∗
N+1
 
by construction). Hence, we would expect a positive value 
of 휌 if practitioners cluster in certain areas (suggesting that 
demand effects are more important than competitive effects). 
If the observed values are negative, this would imply that the 
aim of the regulator is to offer a supply distribution which 
is uniform. In this scenario, the central planner will try to 
make sure that firms are not located too closely to each other 
to increase efficiency and decrease transportation costs in 
remote areas. In this case, whenever the neighbourhood 
profitability Wy∗ grows due to entry, the likelihood of a firm 
establishing itself in the local market will decrease signifi-
cantly, resulting in a negative sign of 휌.
The Bayesian MCMC procedure used for the estimation 
is based on Wilhelm and de Matos [26]. Conditional on the 
observed number of firms and the characteristics of each 
market, a draw is taken for the latent profitability from the 
conditional distribution of y∗ via Gibbs sampling. Once these 
values are obtained, the model can be estimated using stand-
ard Bayesian SAR methods.11
Once the parameters in Eq. (3) are identified, we can ana-
lyse the ease of entry of the first healthcare provider by cal-
culating the so-called monopoly entry threshold ( S1 ), which 
represents the number of consumers necessary to cover the 
fixed costs of the first entrant:
Changes in the value of S1 over time would be indicative 
of changes in the level of entry barriers. A high breakeven 
population is often a signal for regulatory obstacles to entry, 
as well as for low expected profitability per capita, even in 
markets with no additional competitors. By comparing the 
estimated thresholds across time, it is possible to ascertain 
to what extent the transition process changed the barriers to 
entry facing healthcare providers. While the rise in income 
levels is likely to decrease the threshold for entry by increas-
ing per capita demand, government intervention aimed at 
raising efficiency may have made it harder for firms in rural 
S1 = exp(?̂?1 − X̄𝛽 − ?̂?Wy
∗).
areas to remain economically viable. The net effect of these 
changes is reflected in the estimates of S1.
Aside from evaluating the ease of entry for providers with 
a monopoly position, we would also like to access how the 
competitive pressure exerted by each successive entrant has 
changed during the transition period. Following Bresnahan 
and Reiss [2], we focus on the change in per firm break-
even population in order to measure the magnitude of the 
decrease in profitability attributable to each new firm. If new 
entrants result in lower markups for incumbent sellers (either 
through decreasing the price of unregulated services or by 
increasing costs due to investments in quality), the number 
of firms will not grow proportionally to population.
We quantify competitive effects by comparing the per-
firm break-even population for each market structure:
From these estimates, we construct so-called entry threshold 
ratios ( ETRN):
where Nm represents the upper limit of the number of firms 
in a market.12
An increase of entry thresholds with the size of the mar-
ket ( sN < sN+1 ) is an indication of intensified competition. 
Since we assume that in markets with Nm firms, competition 
is at its most intense level (this assumption is valid in mar-
kets where entry results predominantly in business stealing, 
rather than market expansion), an estimate of sN for which 
sNm∕sN = 1 would indicate that N entrants are sufficient for 
a perfectly competitive outcome.
The intuition behind this conclusion is that consumers 
have the same level of demand per capita across market 
structures (a presupposition which is reasonable for health-
care services). Abstracting from competitive effects, we 
would, therefore, expect the number of providers to grow 
proportionally to market size. If this is not the case and 
sNm∕sN > 1 , then firms in a competitive market (with Nm 
firms) need a larger population to break even than those in 
a market with only N competitors. This would indicate that 
healthcare providers in more concentrated markets have 
higher markups, either due to smaller investments in qual-
ity or due to stronger government subsidization. As such, the 
(4)sN =
exp(?̂?N − X̄𝛽 − ?̂?Wy
∗)
N
.
(5)ETRN =
sNm
sN
= exp(휃Nm − 휃N)
N
Nm
11 In particular we assume: 훽 ∼ N(0,T) , where T = IK1012 and 
K is the number of covariates; 휃N ∼ U(휃N−1, 휃N+1) in the interval 
[휃N−1, 휃N+1) ; 휌 ∼ 훽(1, 1) in the interval (−1, 1) . A detailed outline of 
the assumptions and implementation strategy is available in LeSage 
and Pace [25], pp. 279–299. For further information on the estimation 
steps, consult the documentation of the R package spatialpro-
bit.
12 In the empirical analysis, we follow previous research and set 
Nm = 7 in order to have sufficient observations to identify each 
threshold. As additional competitive effects are likely to wane as 
more firms enter, we believe that the loss of information due to this 
censoring is likely to be minimal.
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values of ETRN provide valuable information regarding the 
effects of government policy and strategic firm behaviour.
Entry threshold analysis
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates from the spatial 
ordered probit model. Population exerts a positive effect on 
the likelihood of entry across all industries and time periods. 
Despite the observed variation in the parameter value of 훼 , 
one would expect an extra consumer to have the same addi-
tional value regardless of the number of other patients in the 
municipality. With this in mind, we constrain 훼 by dividing 
all parameters by the estimated value of the population coef-
ficient in order to calculate the break-even population:
Changes in competitive pressure due to entry are measured 
by the ordered probit parameters 휃N . All values are signifi-
cant, suggesting that market structure plays an important role 
in determining profitability. 
Based on these estimates, we calculate the entry threshold 
population (Table 5) and entry threshold ratios ( s7∕sN ) for 
all occupations (Table 6). The results are summarised in 
Fig. 2.  
SN = exp
𝜃 − X̄𝛽
𝛼
.
Table 4  Parameter estimates obtained from a spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010
All markets with more than seven firms are pooled in one category. Standard errors are in parenthesis
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicates that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
Number of 
firms
Pharmacies Physicians Dentists
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population 
(log) ( 훼)
1.581∗∗∗ 
(0.0615)
1.5542∗∗∗
(0.0669)
1.4862∗∗∗ 
(0.0569)
1.6798∗∗∗
(0.0541)
1.8734∗∗∗ 
(0.0490)
1.6971∗∗∗
(0.0459)
1.6628∗∗∗ 
(0.059)
1.8337∗∗∗ 
(0.0537)
1.7436∗∗∗ 
(0.0528)
Wages − 0.0108∗∗ 
(0.0045)
0.0020 
(0.0012)
0.0007 
(0.0005)
− 0.0028 
(0.0037)
0.0006 
(0.0011)
0.0011∗∗∗ 
(0.0004)
− 0.0026 
(0.004)
0.0017 
(0.0010)
0.0012∗∗ 
(0.0005)
Unemploy-
ment (%)
0.3269 
(1.3849)
− 0.7999 
(0.8809)
1.0785 
(0.8725)
0.2123 
(1.1329)
0.8321 
(0.6665)
1.0886 
(0.6789)
0.4579 
(1.244)
0.0676 
(0.7297)
1.7417∗∗ 
(0.8293)
Young (%) − 2.9066∗ 
(1.7566)
− 6.7621∗∗∗ 
(1.7512)
− 4.9087∗∗∗ 
(1.4813)
− 2.2861 
(1.4038)
− 6.3470∗∗∗ 
(1.1880)
− 4.7339∗∗∗ 
(0.9195)
− 5.6278∗∗∗ 
(1.653)
− 5.9705∗∗∗ 
(1.3114)
− 5.2827∗∗∗ 
(1.2721)
Elderly (%) − 1.7934 
(1.6082)
− 1.9326 
(1.6822)
2.5611∗ 
(1.3706)
− 0.5873 
(1.2565)
− 2.397193∗ 
(1.1771)
1.1708 
(0.9842)
− 3.2238∗∗ 
(1.4919)
− 2.8526∗ 
(1.3183)
− 0.0058 
(1.3056)
휃
1 9.7296∗∗∗ 
(1.3969)
12.0160∗∗∗ 
(1.0364)
12.5321∗∗∗ 
(0.7946)
11.8553∗∗∗ 
(1.1638)
12.8529∗∗∗ 
(0.7783)
12.887∗∗∗ 
(0.5902)
10.8794∗∗∗ 
(1.2966)
13.1651∗∗∗ 
(0.8388)
13.9254∗∗∗ 
(0.735)
휃
2 11.3149∗∗∗
(1.4001)
13.6432∗∗∗ 
(1.0553)
13.6673∗∗∗ 
(0.802)
12.6037∗∗∗ 
(1.1645)
13.5408∗∗∗ 
(0.78257)
13.6654∗∗∗ 
(0.5969)
12.3197∗∗∗ 
(1.2994)
14.6949∗∗∗ 
(0.8463)
15.0883∗∗∗ 
(0.741)
휃
3 12.522∗∗∗ 
(1.4065)
14.5257∗∗∗ 
(1.0714)
14.3044∗∗∗ 
(0.8101)
13.4512∗∗∗ 
(1.1665)
14.3558∗∗∗ 
(0.7860)
14.3308∗∗∗ 
(0.6044)
13.1256∗∗∗ 
(1.3023)
15.4816∗∗∗ 
(0.8531)
15.7086∗∗∗ 
(0.7511)
휃
4 12.7734∗∗∗ 
(1.4076)
15.1495∗∗∗ 
(1.0791)
14.7668∗∗∗ 
(0.8208)
14.0205∗∗∗ 
(1.1698)
14.9443∗∗∗ 
(0.7914)
14.7624∗∗∗ 
(0.6138)
13.5864∗∗∗ 
(1.3019)
15.9618∗∗∗ 
(0.8535)
16.1909∗∗∗ 
(0.7587)
휃
5 13.537∗∗∗ 
(1.4102)
15.5600∗∗∗ 
(1.0884)
15.0626∗∗∗ 
(0.8300)
14.3118∗∗∗ 
(1.1726)
15.3865∗∗∗ 
(0.7956)
15.1595∗∗∗ 
(0.6222)
13.8629∗∗∗ 
(1.3048)
16.4208∗∗∗ 
(0.8625)
16.5189∗∗∗ 
(0.7661)
휃
6 13.8898∗∗∗ 
(1.412)
16.1496∗∗∗ 
(1.1033)
15.3487∗∗∗ 
(0.8369)
14.6986∗∗∗ 
(1.1757)
15.6796∗∗∗ 
(0.8014)
15.4091∗∗∗ 
(0.6279)
14.1789∗∗∗ 
(1.3092)
16.7411∗∗∗ 
(0.8659)
16.9791∗∗∗ 
(0.7756)
휃
7 16.4266∗∗∗ 
(1.1080)
15.6829∗∗∗ 
(0.8464)
15.103∗∗∗ 
(1.1804)
15.9133∗∗∗ 
(0.8024)
15.6599∗∗∗ 
(0.6322)
14.5101∗∗∗ 
(1.3113)
17.0764∗∗∗ 
(0.8710)
17.3302∗∗∗ 
(0.7857)
휌 − 0.3573∗∗∗ 
(0.0631)
− 0.3389∗∗∗ 
(0.0632)
− 0.161∗∗ 
(0.0625)
− 0.4082∗∗∗ 
(0.0571)
− 0.4600∗∗∗ 
(0.0423)
− 0.2827∗∗∗ 
(0.0439)
− 0.3623∗∗∗ 
(0.0612)
− 0.3838∗∗∗ 
(0.0468)
− 0.2747∗∗∗ 
(0.0501)
Observa-
tions
2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926
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Table 5  Per-firm entry thresholds for Slovakia in 2010, 2001, and 1995 for pharmacies, doctors and dentists (spatial model)
Standard errors are in parenthesis
Pharmacies Physicians Dentists
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Total threshold population
S
1
3845 4876 3335 2360 1959 1532 3007 2436 2529
S
2
10,479 13,893 7159 3685 2828 2424 7150 5610 4928
S
3
22,487 24,512 10,990 6103 4369 3587 11,609 8616 7033
S
4
26,362 36,616 15,002 8564 5982 4626 15,316 11,195 9274
S
5
42,731 47,685 18,306 10,187 7574 5845 18,087 14,379 11,194
S
6
53,412 69,686 22,191 12,824 8857 6772 21,872 17,123 14,575
S
7
83,281 27,786 16,314 10,033 7850 26,694 20,559 17,826
Threshold population per firm
s
1
3845 (292) 4876 (420) 3335 (243) 2360 (114) 1959 (71) 1532 (49) 3007 (178) 2436 (102) 2529 (115)
s
2
5240 (282) 6946 (429) 3580 (166) 1842 (51) 1414 (27) 1212 (21) 3575 (147) 2805 (82) 2464 (71)
s
3
7496 (349) 8171 (395) 3663 (130) 2034 (47) 1456 (22) 1196 (16) 3870 (130) 2872 (67) 2344 (52)
s
4
6591 (238) 9154 (356) 3750 (107) 2141 (44) 1495 (20) 1156 (14) 3829 (105) 2799 (57) 2319 (43)
s
5
8546 (272) 9537 (313) 3661 (88) 2037 (35) 1515 (18) 1169 (12) 3617 (83) 2876 (51) 2239 (35)
s
6
8902 (246) 11,614 (343) 3698 (77) 2137 (34) 1476 (16) 1129 (11) 3645 (74) 2854 (43) 2429 (34)
s
7
11,897 (310) 3969 (74) 2331 (34) 1433 (14) 1121 (10) 3813 (70) 2937 (40) 2547 (33)
Table 6  Entry threshold ratios for Slovakia in 2010, 2001, and 1995 for pharmacies, doctors and dentists (spatial model)
Standard errors are in parenthesis
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicates that ETRs are significantly different from one at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
Pharmacies Physicians Dentists
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Per-firm entry threshold ratios ( s
7
∕sN)
s
7
∕s
1
2.32 (0.19) 2.44 (0.22) 1.19 (0.09) 0.99 (0.05) 0.73 (0.03) 0.73 (0.02) 1.27 (0.08) 1.21 (0.05) 1.01 (0.05)
s
7
∕s
2
1.70 (0.10) 1.71 (0.11) 1.11 (0.06) 1.27 (0.04) 1.01 (0.02) 0.93 (0.02) 1.07 (0.05) 1.05 (0.03) 1.03 (0.03)
s
7
∕s
3
1.19 (0.06) 1.49 (0.08) 1.08 (0.04) 1.15 (0.03) 0.98 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02) 0.99 (0.04) 1.02 (0.03) 1.09 (0.03)
s
7
∕s
4
1.35 (0.06) 1.30 (0.06) 1.06 (0.04) 1.09 (0.03) 0.96 (0.02) 0.97 (0.01) 1.00 (0.03) 1.05 (0.03) 1.10 (0.02)
s
7
∕s
5
1.04 (0.04) 1.25 (0.05) 1.08 (0.03) 1.14 (0.03) 0.95 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01) 1.05 (0.03) 1.02 (0.02) 1.14 (0.02)
s
7
∕s
6
1.02 (0.04) 1.07 (0.03) 1.09 (0.2) 0.97 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 1.05 (0.03) 1.03 (0.02) 1.05 (0.02)
Test: s
7
∕sN = 1
s
7
∕s
1
= 1 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Chi-sq. 49.42 43.07 4.53 0.06 95.71 121.78 11.6 15.11 0.02
s
7
∕s
2
= 1 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Chi-sq. 46.32 38.47 3.86 44.33 0.39 17.31 1.93 1.97 1.06
s
7
∕s
3
= 1 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Chi-sq. 8.51 32.46 3.7 21.64 0.77 17.05 0.15 0.66 9.51
s
7
∕s
4
= 1 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗
Chi-sq. 32.55 24.23 2.60 10.52 6.53 4.50 0.02 3.68 15.89
s
7
∕s
5
= 1 ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗
Chi-sq. 0.90 22.41 6.47 30.60 12.98 9.73 3.07 0.87 35.48
s
7
∕s
6
= 1 ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Chi-sq. 0.36 5.93 14.84 4.06 0.24 2.60 1.91 5.81
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In the values reported below, means are used for the vari-
ables capturing market characteristics ( X̄ ) and the spatial 
weights matrix W is replaced by a zero matrix to mimic the 
usual assumption of isolated markets.13
Entry barriers
In the market for pharmacy services, entry barriers appear 
to have fluctuated significantly over time. The estimated 
monopoly entry threshold ( S1 ) in Table 5 suggests that 3845 
inhabitants were necessary for a single firm to break even 
in 1995. This number jumped to 4876 in 2001 and subse-
quently fell to the initial level of just over 3000.
When analysing this development, it is important to note 
that the privatization process for pharmacies was concluded 
in 1994, meaning that the outcome in 1995 is influenced to a 
large extent by pre-liberalization dynamics and reflects the 
goal of the government to ensure market coverage by setting 
extremely low entry barriers for the first potential entrant.
Once the privatization process was complete, the role of 
regulator was taken up by the Slovak Chamber of Pharma-
cists, which sought to introduce explicit demographic and 
population criteria for establishment as a way of improving 
the performance of its members. The estimated entry thresh-
old of 4876 individuals fits well with the legal limit set by 
the Chamber, which required that at least 5000 inhabitants 
should be served by each pharmacy seeking to enter the 
market. The rise in entry barriers may also be fuelled by the 
loss of economies of scale which are sometimes present in 
systems under government control.
The subsequent sharp decrease in entry barriers between 
2001 and 2010 can largely be attributed to the decisions 
of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic against 
the Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists [17–19] which removed 
entry restrictions and liberalised ownership. The more leni-
ent approach to the formation of distribution chains may 
have allowed firms to reduce operation costs. Further-
more, the income level in the country rose, which naturally 
depresses the estimates of S1.
In comparison, the monopoly entry threshold value for 
physicians and dentists remained stable between 1995 and 
2010, a clear indication of the role of administrative deci-
sion-making in these industries. Entry into these markets is 
strongly regulated and the supply of services was reasonably 
good during the communist regime, leading to very little 
change during our observation period.
However, it should be pointed out that previous research 
in Lábaj et al. [24] has shown that in competitive industries 
the increase in income levels between 1995 and 2010 led to a 
substantial decrease in entry barriers. As such, the healthcare 
industry grew more slowly than its more competitive retail 
counterparts during the transition period. The inability of the 
industry to generate higher levels of entry may be due to gov-
ernment intervention seeking to sanitise the finances of the 
healthcare system. In 2004 a “reform package of laws” was 
adopted to reduce financial inefficiency by limiting consump-
tion [27]. This attempt to improve the efficiency of the provid-
ers may have offset the positive effect of rising income levels.
Competitive effects
The changes in entry barriers were also accompanied by 
changes in the relationship between market structure (the 
number of firms) and per-capita profitability. However, the 
estimated entry threshold ratios shown in Fig. 3 and Table 6 
point to heterogeneity in the influence of market structure 
on markups across healthcare markets. 
Deregulation on the market for pharmaceutical services 
had a substantial effect on the relationship between the num-
ber of firms and expected profitability. Before the removal of 
entry barriers, a market with six firms required about 2.32 
times the per-firm population of a monopolistic market to 
break even.14 This suggests that regulators were reluctant to 
introduce new firms into areas where an incumbent was pre-
sent. The position of monopolists appears to have been most 
profitable during the brief period of strict self-regulation.15 
1995 2001 2010
-50%
0%
50%
Pharmacies
Physicians
Dentists
Fig. 2  Changes in the break-even population (baseline: 2001)
14 A duopolistic market still required 1.36 times the per-firm popula-
tion of a monopolist to break even (this is not shown in Fig. 3, which 
takes a competitive market with six firms as a benchmark).
15 The introduction of entry restrictions by the Slovak Chamber of 
Pharmacists may have led to censoring in the number of firms. As 
such, the coefficients estimated in 2001 may include both competi-
tive and regulatory effects. To take this into account, we additionally 
report the estimates from a censored ordered probit model in Sec-
tion “Counterfactual analysis”.
13 To ensure comparability with previous research, we also estimated 
the model using a non-spatial specification and focusing on rural 
areas. These results can be found in the Appendix.
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The policy measures introduced in 2004 resulted in a very 
different relationship between markets in 2010, when a firm 
with six competitors (in a duopoly) only needed 11% (7%) 
more consumers than its monopolistic counterparts to break 
even. This suggests that the abolition of entry restrictions 
made concentrated markets contestable and led to a decrease 
in markups (this effect is likely to occur due to an increased 
investment in quality and hence higher costs, rather than 
differences in prices).
Changes in regulatory policy also influenced the entry 
threshold ratios in other healthcare industries. While per-
capita profitability in monopoly markets appears to have 
increased only marginally for physicians and dentists 
(as reflected by the small changes in S1 ), the profits on 
competitive markets grew. This is clearly visible from the 
results in Table 5, which show that entry thresholds for seven 
firms decreased substantially. This process may explain the 
fact that ETRs are falling with time. Surprisingly, results 
for physicians even point to ETRs which are significantly 
lower than 1. This would indicate that firms on competitive 
markets experience higher per-capita profits than monopo-
lists. This may be due to the large scope for differentiation in 
the industry. Especially in the case of large hospitals, which 
are likely to be situated in densely populated municipalities, 
the clustering of practitioners may attract more consumers. 
As such, it cannot be ruled out that entry in these markets 
does not necessarily lead to more competition for a given 
number of potential customers. As argued in Schaumans and 
Fig. 3  Break-even population 
and ETRs in transition
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Table 7  Transition matrix: 
pharmacies 1995 Number of firms in 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.97 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.43 0.4 0.14 0.03 0 0 0 0
2 0.15 0.33 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.07
3 0 0 0.33 0 0.17 0 0.17 0.33
4 0 0.06 0.11 0 0 0.11 0.22 0.5
5 0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0.5 0 0.17
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Verboven [22], entry might also increase product variety and 
thereby have a positive effect on consumers’ willingness to 
pay. This countervailing effect of entry reduces entry thresh-
old ratios and could explain ratios smaller than one.
Spatial spillovers
Spatial spillover effects are captured by the parameter 휌 
which measures the influence of the spatially weighted 
(unobserved) measure of neighbourhood profitability ( Wy∗ ) 
on the (unobserved) measure of profitability in the local 
market ( y∗).
Table 4 reports significant and negative spatial correla-
tion effects for all periods and occupations. This suggests 
that spatial spillovers play an important role in determin-
ing profitability. The negative estimates can be interpreted 
as an indication that the effect of competitive linkages out-
weighs the demand spillover effects associated with attrac-
tive neighboring markets. The presence of a competitor in 
the neighbourhood (and hence a higher sampled Wy∗ ) results 
in a lower probability of entry. Such an effect could occur on 
markets where entry is coordinated and professionals seek to 
avoid direct competition for patients. It is also a likely result 
if healthcare services are offered in a hierarchical manner 
with only the most profitable markets hosting a seller, as 
predicted by models of urban development. As mentioned in 
Rosenthal et al. [8], the concentration of services in particu-
lar areas and their unavailability in adjacent markets implies 
that health policy should consider the possibility of patients 
travelling across administrative borders.
Interestingly, this effect wanes over our observation 
period, with the absolute value of 휌 decreasing with time. 
This result is especially strong on the pharmacy market. 
One could interpret the estimates as an indication that 
with improved infrastructure and increased agglomeration, 
firms now expect to be patronised by more consumers from 
neighbouring markets and demand spillovers are starting to 
outweigh competitive effects. While there are no positive 
externalities for incumbents when new pharmacies enter in 
the same region, it may be more attractive for pharmacies to 
locate in adjacent markets if other industries are clustered 
in the region and hence attracting commuters and improving 
the growth prospects of the area. This, coupled with the fact 
that location decisions are no longer regulated, can lead to a 
tendency for co-location.
As an additional indication for the rise in co-location can 
be seen if we calculate transition matrices. Table 7 shows 
the transition probabilities across market structures. While 
most markets with a high number of sellers managed to keep 
the number of firms constant (or even increase this num-
ber) over the 15 years of observation, 43% of the monopoly 
markets lost their only provider of services over the same 
period. This suggests that once entry was deregulated, cer-
tain areas (particularly smaller villages) did not benefit from 
more entry but rather lost services to larger neighbouring 
markets. As such, it seems that while deregulation of the 
Table 8  Transition matrix: 
dentists 1995 Number of firms in 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.95 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.28 0.56 0.12 0.03 0.01 0 0 0
2 0.02 0.27 0.29 0.2 0.09 0.11 0 0.02
3 0 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
4 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0
5 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4
6 0 0 0 0.11 0 0.22 0.11 0.56
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.96
Table 9  Transition matrix: 
physicians 1995 Number of firms in 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.89 0.08 0.03 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.08 0.04 0.03 0 0.03
2 0.05 0.22 0.36 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.02
3 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.27 0.08 0.04 0.13
4 0 0 0 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.24
5 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.83
6 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0.07 0.87
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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sector has had an overall positive effect on entry, the major-
ity of the benefits were reaped by towns and villages where 
supply levels were already high. This result is also present 
in the market for dental (medical) services, with 28% (21%) 
of monopoly markets in 1995 losing their access to a local 
provider of services (Tables 8, 9). 
Counterfactual analysis
Our overall results point to very small changes in firm 
behaviour on the market for physicians and dentists, and sig-
nificant changes in the pharmacy market. In order to deter-
mine to what extent the results are driven by “behavioural 
effects” rather than changes in external market conditions 
(such as demand and cost characteristics or changes in the 
regulatory framework), we implement two counterfactual 
scenarios. The first generates predictions for the number 
of entrants using the parameter estimates from each of 
the three periods, while holding constant the distribution, 
income level and demographic structure of the population 
in each market. As such, this analysis shows how much of 
the change in the equilibrium number of firms was driven 
by “behavioural effects” as opposed to adjustments in con-
sumer characteristics. The first part of this section details 
the predicted entry behaviour in each regime.
The second counterfactual scenario focuses instead on 
the possibility of changing the regulatory framework. Since 
our data include a period of self-regulation in the pharmacy 
industry, we explicitly model the restrictions imposed by the 
Chamber of Pharmacists and predict how the distribution of 
firms would have been altered by a reduction in the imposed 
standards. The results from this analysis are summarised in 
the second part of this section.
Effect of changes in overall economic conditions
Much of the fluctuation in the number of firms over time is 
due to changes in market characteristics. To gain more insight 
into the differences in entry behaviour (“behavioural effects”) 
while keeping market fundamentals constant, we focus on 
the dataset from 2010 and predict the number of firms using 
the parameters estimated by the models in each time period.
We estimate the expected number of firms on each market 
for period i as:
Tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 show the results of the 
estimation. In each table, the predicted number of firms in 
2010 is compared to the predicted number of firms using 
parameters from the two prior periods (1995 and 2001). The 
observations on the diagonal of the matrix represent markets 
which would be expected to have the same market structure 
in both periods under investigation. Observations below the 
diagonal indicate that more firms would be expected to enter 
in 2010 than in the comparison period. In other words, in the 
counterfactual based on the earlier regulatory climate, fewer 
sellers would be on the market. Conversely, observations 
above the diagonal suggest that entry was less likely on those 
markets in 2010 than it would have been in previous periods. 
The most striking results are visible for pharmacies. 
Between 1995 and 2010, the predicted number of uncov-
ered markets is estimated to have decreased by 288 due to 
“behavioural effects” (see Table 10). All 176 markets which 
E(yi) =
Nm∑
N=1
Pr(yi = N|X2010, ln S2010, 훼i, 훽i, 휃i)N.
Table 10  Entry predictions for pharmacies under 1995 and 2010 mar-
ket conditions
Number of firms in 
2010
Number of firms in 1995
0 1 2 Total
0 2605 0 0 2605
1 176 0 0 176
2 39 0 0 39
3 27 0 0 27
4 20 2 0 22
5 17 12 1 30
6 9 16 2 27
Total 2893 30 3 2926
Table 11  Entry predictions for 
pharmacies under 2001 and 
2010 market conditions
Number of firms 
in 2010
Number of firms in 2001
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
0 2577 28 0 0 0 0 0 2605
1 20 156 0 0 0 0 0 176
2 0 21 18 0 0 0 0 39
3 0 0 25 2 0 0 0 27
4 0 0 0 16 5 1 0 22
5 0 0 0 0 24 6 0 30
6 0 0 0 0 1 15 11 27
Total 2597 205 43 18 30 22 11 2926
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are expected to accommodate one firm in 2010, would have 
remained without coverage in 1995. While the results are 
clearly indicative of significant changes in firm behaviour, 
it is important to note that they are driven in part by the 
fact that wages have a strong negative impact on entry in 
1995 (this is the only period and the only industry for which 
this holds true). Given the wage growth observed during 
the transition period, the extreme differences in predicted 
entry behaviour may be due mainly to an unexplained 
change in the response of firms to overall wage levels. 
As such, we would be cautious in basing specific policy 
recommendations on the predicted behaviour of firms in this 
particular counterfactual simulation.
The predicted entry behaviour based on parameter esti-
mates from the period of self-regulation (2001) and the lib-
eralization thereafter (2010) is summarised in Table 11. The 
simulation suggests that entry of additional firms on markets 
with at least one incumbent was significantly harder in 2001 
than in 2010. Of the 39 predicted duopoly markets in 2010, 
21 would have been a monopoly in 2001. The process is 
even more severe in more atomistic markets. Of the 27 (22) 
markets with 3 (4) firms, 25 (16) would see lower entry in 
Table 12  Entry predictions for 
physicians under 1995 and 2010 
market conditions
Number of firms 
in 2010
Number of firms in 1995
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1976
1 447 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 499
2 49 134 4 0 0 0 0 0 187
3 1 53 18 0 0 0 0 0 72
4 0 9 36 4 0 0 0 0 49
5 0 1 13 11 5 0 0 0 30
6 0 0 1 9 16 5 0 0 31
7 0 0 0 0 3 17 31 31 82
Total 2473 249 72 24 24 22 31 31 2926
Table 13  Entry predictions for 
physicians under 2001 and 2010 
market conditions
Number of firms 
in 2010
Number of firms in 2001
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 1972 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1976
1 114 382 3 0 0 0 0 0 499
2 0 65 116 6 0 0 0 0 187
3 0 0 28 42 2 0 0 0 72
4 0 0 1 18 28 2 0 0 49
5 0 0 0 0 12 15 3 0 30
6 0 0 0 0 1 4 25 1 31
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 80 82
Total 2086 451 148 66 43 21 30 81 2926
Table 14  Entry predictions for 
dentists under 1995 and 2010 
market conditions
Number of firms 
in 2010
Number of firms in 1995
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 2403 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 2411
1 87 207 0 0 0 0 0 0 294
2 0 49 28 0 0 0 0 0 77
3 0 1 20 7 0 0 0 0 28
4 0 0 2 20 2 0 0 0 24
5 0 0 0 1 15 1 0 0 17
6 0 0 0 0 0 17 7 0 24
7 0 0 0 0 0 5 22 24 51
Total 2490 265 50 28 17 23 29 24 2926
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2001. However, it should be noted that the estimates also 
predict that fewer markets would remain uncovered in 2001. 
Of the 2605 markets which have a negative monopoly profit 
in 2010, 28 would have been deemed profitable in 2001. As 
such, self-regulation seems to encourage entry into rural/less 
attractive markets.16
The results for physicians also show a large difference in 
expected firm behaviour from 1995 to 2010 (Table 12). In 
particular, 497 markets which are not expected to be covered 
in 1995, see entry in 2010. A similar, though less strong 
effect is visible when comparing 2001 and 2010 (Table 13). 
Of the 499 monopolies predicted in 2010, 114 would not 
have been covered in 2001.
On average consumers seem to have benefited from the 
transition process with regard to the supply of dental ser-
vices. Table 14 shows that competition intensified in most 
markets and expected coverage improved. However, it 
appears that most of the improvement was due to processes 
occurring before 2001. The results in Table 15 indicate that 
entry became harder after the initial stages of transition were 
over. In fact, of the 2411 markets which are expected to 
remain uncovered in 2010, 152 would have been able to 
accommodate a monopolist in 2001.
The effects of regulation in the pharmacy sector 
(2001)
As outlined in Section “Transition of thehealthcare sys-
tem in Slovakia”, the transition process for pharmacies 
involved a period of self-governance, which encompasses 
the observations from 2001. During this stage of the transi-
tion, general restrictions were passed which required at least 
5000 inhabitants per pharmacy and a minimum distance of 
500 m between pharmacies.
The licensing process poses a problem for the identifica-
tion of the competitive effects. In particular, it means that 
firms may fail to enter in profitable markets due to restric-
tions placed by the Chamber of Pharmacists. We take this 
into account by following Schaumans and Verboven [12] and 
estimating a standard censored ordered probit.
The sample of observations is split into two groups. The 
first group contains all observations in which the regulation 
is not binding. For these observations, the likelihood function 
remains unchanged. We expect to see N firms on the market if:
If we denote the density of the error term 휀 as f(.), the prob-
ability of observing N firms is equal to:
The second part of the sample consists of the 284 observa-
tions for which the regulation is binding. On those markets, 
the entry of an additional firm would reduce the number of 
inhabitants per capita to less than 5000.
We denote the maximum number of firms allowed on the 
market with N̄ . Observing N̄ firms on markets with binding 
restrictions is less informative than it would be under free 
entry. We can conclude that the market is profitable for N̄ 
firms but it may be erroneous to assume that it is unprofit-
able for N̄ + 1 firms:
This means that the censored observations provide no infor-
mation regarding the value of 𝜃N̄+1 . We take this into account 
by adjusting the likelihood specification on these markets:
ln S + X𝛽 − 𝜃N+1 < 𝜀 ≤ ln S + X𝛽 − 𝜃N .
Pr(y = N) =
∫
ln S+X훽−휃N
ln S+X훽−휃N+1
f (u) du.
𝜀 ≤ ln S + X𝛽 − 𝜃N̄ if y = N̄.
Pr(y = N̄) =
∫
ln S+X𝛽−𝜃N̄
−∞
f (u) du.
Table 15  Entry predictions for 
dentists under 2001 and 2010 
market conditions
Number of firms 
in 2010
Number of firms in 2001
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 2259 152 0 0 0 0 0 0 2411
1 1 264 29 0 0 0 0 0 294
2 0 0 69 8 0 0 0 0 77
3 0 0 2 20 6 0 0 0 28
4 0 0 0 1 18 5 0 0 24
5 0 0 0 0 1 12 4 0 17
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 7 24
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50 51
Total 2260 416 100 29 25 17 22 57 2926
16 It is important to note that in the present analysis, the restrictions 
imposed through the regulation are not explicitly incorporated into 
the econometric model. In practice, we observe entry beyond the 
maximum number of firms which is allowed by the regulation. This 
is due to the fact that no licenses were revoked by the new legisla-
tion. As such, the observed market structure is the result of liberalised 
entry prior to self-regulation and new firm establishments which were 
subject to the restrictions. Section  “Counterfactual analysis” deals 
with this issue in detail.
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The combined likelihood of observing N firms on a given 
market is formed using a dummy variable d set equal to 1 if 
the regulation is not binding ( y < N̄)17: The results from this estimation are reported in Table 16. 
With the exception of the first threshold, the results point 
to significantly lower entry barriers once restrictions are 
taken into account. This indicates that the regulatory envi-
ronment played a dominant role in preventing firm entry. 
However, it should be noted that most markets with incum-
bent firms are subject to binding restrictions, which means 
that the estimates from the censored model are based on 
a likelihood function which is less informative than in the 
unrestricted model. Of the 220 (38) monopoly (duopoly) 
markets in our dataset, 214 (32) are censored. This means 
that only 6 monopoly observations can provide an indication 
for where the threshold for the second entrant should lie. As 
such, our ability to estimate the thresholds for more than 1 
firm is severely limited. Nevertheless, the conclusion that 
l = dPr(y = N) + (1 − d)Pr(y = N̄).
Table 16  Results from censored 
ordered probit model
Standard errors are in parentheses
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicates that parameters are significantly different
from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
Uncensored model Censored model
Population 1.4824∗∗∗ (0.0643) 1.2613∗∗∗ (0.0654)
Wages 0.0003 (0.0011) 0.0009 (0.0011)
Unemployment 0.0041 (0.0071) − 0.0009 (0.0074)
Young − 6.6865∗∗∗ (1.6631) − 5.4854∗∗∗ (1.6390)
Elderly − 2.9235∗ (1.6054) − 2.4639 (1.5978)
휃
1 10.2375∗∗∗ (0.9807) 8.3650∗∗∗ (0.9859)
휃
2 11.8328∗∗∗ (1.0004) 8.6558∗∗∗ (0.9997)
휃
3 12.6892∗∗∗ (1.0185) 9.4667∗∗∗ (1.0495)
휃
4 13.3139∗∗∗ (1.0327) 10.0466∗∗∗ (1.0663)
휃
5 13.7131∗∗∗ (1.0434) 10.3940∗∗∗ (1.0769)
휃
6 14.2960∗∗∗ (1.0610) 11.0081∗∗∗ (1.0986)
휃
7 14.5357∗∗∗ (1.0695) 11.1353∗∗∗ (1.1039)
Threshold population per firm
s
1
3189 3571
s
2
4676 2248
s
3
5555 2851
s
4
6351 3386
s
5
6650 3568
s
6
8211 4838
s
7
8274 4587
Per-firm entry threshold ratios ( s
7
∕sN)
s
7
∕s
1
2.59 1.28
s
7
∕s
2
1.77 2.04
s
7
∕s
3
1.49 1.61
s
7
∕s
4
1.30 1.35
s
7
∕s
5
1.24 1.29
s
7
∕s
6
1.01 0.95
Observations 2897 2897
17 Unlike Schaumans and Verboven [12], we assume that the restric-
tions are not binding on markets with zero pharmacies. This assump-
tion is based on the text of the legislation, which states that “[t]he 
committee of the regional chamber shall not issue a certificate to an 
applicant if he or she is to pursue the occupation of a pharmacist in 
a pharmacy less than 500 metres from another pharmacy or if the 
number of inhabitants per public pharmacy in the region goes below 
5,000” [16]. While the precise meaning of the text is subject to inter-
pretation, as it could imply that the number of inhabitants for the cur-
rent incumbents should not be decreased or that the applicant is also 
taken into account when calculating this number. Since in rural areas 
the 5000 inhabitants rule is likely to be applied using a wider defini-
tion of the market than the village itself, we assume that the regula-
tion is likely to be lenient with the goal of ensuring geographic cover-
age.
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there is a significant difference in mark-ups across market 
structures holds true. 
Despite the short-comings of the censored model, it can 
provide some evidence with regard to the effects of self-
regulation on the equilibrium number of firms. We conduct 
a counterfactual analysis in which we examine the effects of 
reducing restrictions to entry. Following Schaumans and Ver-
boven [12], we define 훷 as the factor by which the restrictions 
are relaxed. If 훷 = 1 , then the restriction remains in place and 
no new pharmacy can enter the market if it reduces the number 
of inhabitants per incumbent to less than 5000. If 훷 = 2 , then 
the restriction is relaxed and requires only 2500 inhabitants 
per pharmacy. This is identical to a doubling of the number of 
firms permitted on the market.
In this framework, the expected number of firms can be 
defined as:
In Table 17, we show the estimated number of firms using 
the parameters suggested by the censored model, where the 
predicted number of firms is rounded to an integer. The pre-
dicted distribution of firms under the 2001 legislation does 
not perfectly coincide with the observed entry behaviour. 
This is due in part to unobserved market specific sources of 
profitability, as well as to the fact that the restrictions placed 
on the market were sometimes violated due to the historical 
presence of a pharmacy in a given area. Since the regulation 
only applied to new applicants, we observe pharmacies in 
markets where in principle the regulatory framework should 
not allow their entry. 
According to the model of restricted entry, 2699 mar-
kets are expected to remain uncovered. Allowing for free 
entry on all markets would lead to entry in 161 of these mar-
kets. Additionally, of the 117 markets on which we expect 
to observe 1 firm under the 2001 legislation, 75 would see 
E(y) =
𝛷N̄−1∑
N=1
Pr(y = N)N + Pr(y = 𝛷N̄)𝛷N̄.
an increase in supply by at least one additional firm if the 
restriction were lifted. Similar processes are observed on 
more competitive markets as well.
As a next step, we contemplate the effects of a loosen-
ing of the legislation (rather than a complete removal). In 
particular, we set 훷 = 2 . The results from this experiment 
are reported in Table 18. The effects of such an intervention 
are limited in markets with low predicted profitability. The 
main change occurs in monopoly markets, of which 29% 
become a duopoly. 
Summary and extensions
The present paper documents the changes in competitive 
behaviour in markets for professional healthcare services 
during the transition of Slovakia from a centrally planned 
to a market economy. An entry model is estimated with 
a cross section from each stage of the transition (1995, 
2001, 2010) to quantify the changes in entry barriers and 
competitive pressure. The data from 1995 characterise the 
initial period of transition, which was largely pre-deter-
mined by decisions made prior to liberalization. By 2001, 
the results of the first set of reforms of the sector are vis-
ible, especially in those industries where regulation was 
outsourced from the government to representatives of the 
profession. The data from 2010 reflect the final outcomes 
of the transition process.
We find that firm entry became easier during the tran-
sition. However, this effect is much smaller than the one 
estimated for retail industries outside healthcare.18 By 
2010, approximately 1500 inhabitants were required for the 
first physician to enter a market and around 2500 (3300) 
Table 17  Entry predictions 
under 2001 regulatory 
environment and free entry ( 훷 
large)
Number of firms 
under restrictions
Number of firms under free entry
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 2538 161 0 0 0 0 0 0 2699
1 0 42 49 26 0 0 0 0 117
2 0 0 0 4 15 0 0 0 19
3 0 0 0 0 5 11 0 0 16
4 0 0 0 0 0 11 2 0 13
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 0 10
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 11
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12
Total 2538 203 49 30 20 23 22 12 2897
18 See Lábaj et al. [24] for an overview of entry threshold levels for 
other industries.
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inhabitants were necessary in a local market for the first den-
tist (pharmacist) to break even. The relatively modest change 
in entry thresholds may reflect the government’s policy of 
providing medical services in regional centres where they 
are accessible to the largest possible number of customers, 
which biases entry behaviour towards very large towns and 
therefore results in high monopoly thresholds, even in the 
context of a growing economy.
The effect of entry differs across professions. For physi-
cians and dentists, the effect of entry has changed very little 
over time. Furthermore, it seems that new entrants do not 
depress the per-capita profitability of incumbents (or do so 
very modestly). As such, one would conclude that on these 
markets differentiation and regulatory intervention alleviate 
the effects of market structure.
This is not the case in the pharmaceutical industry, where 
we find very strong effects of market structure in 1995. The 
data suggest that monopolists made significantly higher prof-
its directly after the beginning of the transition. This effect 
becomes more pronounced during the period of self-regula-
tion. The estimates for 2001 show that a monopoly position 
resulted in even higher profitability in this phase. The sharp 
decline both in entry barriers and in profit differences across 
market structures by 2010 seems to suggest that the policy 
reforms (the decisions of the Antimonopoly Office of the 
Slovak Republic against the Slovak Chamber of Pharma-
cists) were effective. The removal of entry restrictions and 
the liberalization of ownership rights led to a reduction in 
the break-even population, more entry and an intensification 
of competition. There does not seem to be a large premium 
on having a monopoly position in a healthcare profession in 
the modern Slovak economy.
Further research is necessary to determine the precise 
channels by which these outcomes were influenced. In 
particular, information on the actual number of patients and 
the payments which the practitioners received per-capita 
would make a more in-depth analysis possible. This informa-
tion would also allow for a more precise market delineation, 
as it would provide information on the true distribution of 
consumers.
This analysis would also benefit from an extension which 
identifies each individual pharmacy and hence analyses not 
only the equilibrium outcomes but also the entry and exit 
decisions upon which they are founded. In this context, it 
may be important to also take into account complementa-
rities across different types of practitioners, as outlined in 
Schaumans and Verboven [12].
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Appendix
To assess the importance of spatial effects in more detail, 
we re-estimate and compare the results of a model using a 
non-spatial framework (which corresponds to the empiri-
cal approach applied in previous studies). We look at two 
Table 18  Entry predictions 
under 2001 regulatory 
environment and lenient 
regulation ( 훷 = 2)
Number of firms 
under restrictions
Number of firms under lenient regulation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 2699 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2699
1 0 83 34 0 0 0 0 0 117
2 0 0 0 13 6 0 0 0 19
3 0 0 0 0 7 9 0 0 16
4 0 0 0 0 0 11 2 0 13
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 0 10
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 11
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12
Total 2699 83 34 13 13 21 22 12 2897
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Table 19  Parameter estimates obtained from a sample of rural areas
All markets with more than seven firms are pooled in one category. Standard errors are in parenthesis
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicates that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
Fewer than seven thresholds are estimated if no observations of this market structure are available
Number of 
firms
Pharmacies Physicians Dentists
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population 
(log) ( 훼)
1.5292∗∗∗ 
(0.0697)
1.3311∗∗∗ 
(0.0699)
1.3452∗∗∗ 
(0.0597)
1.5984∗∗∗ 
(0.0575)
1.8566∗∗∗ 
(0.0594)
1.6658∗∗∗ 
(0.0501)
1.5791∗∗∗ 
(0.0652)
1.8148∗∗∗ 
(0.0663)
1.6371∗∗∗ 
(0.0600)
Wages − 0.0088∗∗ 
(0.0041)
0.0007 
(0.0014)
− 0.0004 
(0.0006)
− 0.0015 
(0.0033)
− 0.0002 
(0.0010)
0.0005 
(0.0004)
− 0.0004 
(0.0037)
0.0000 
(0.0012)
0.0004 
(0.0005)
Unemploy-
ment (%)
0.0130 
(0.0117)
0.0017 
(0.0074)
0.0139∗ 
(0.0080)
0.0210∗∗ 
(0.0094)
0.0238∗∗∗ 
(0.0055)
0.0247∗∗∗ 
(0.0059)
0.0235∗∗ 
(0.0105)
0.0166∗∗∗ 
(0.0060)
0.0293∗∗∗ 
(0.0072)
Young (%) − 2.1362 
(1.6659)
− 6.8591∗∗∗ 
(1.7019)
− 6.1095∗∗∗ 
(1.6221)
− 1.8447 
(1.3235)
− 6.5756∗∗∗ 
(1.1482)
− 4.9537∗∗∗ 
(0.9132)
− 4.5149∗∗∗ 
(1.5459)
− 6.1728∗∗∗ 
(1.2817)
− 5.3199∗∗∗ 
(1.2992)
Elderly (%) − 1.6393 
(1.5198)
− 3.9007∗∗ 
(1.6796)
1.0596 
(1.5369)
− 0.5942 
(1.1946)
− 3.2130∗∗∗ 
(1.1551)
0.9848 
(0.9909)
− 2.9983∗∗ 
(1.3947)
− 3.6377∗∗∗ 
(1.3264)
− 0.4611 
(1.3641)
휃
1 9.4592∗∗∗ 
(1.3517)
8.9922∗∗∗ 
(1.1003)
9.9761∗∗∗ 
(0.9076)
11.3779∗∗∗ 
(1.0994)
12.0028∗∗∗ 
(0.8011)
12.1211∗∗∗ 
(0.6369)
10.7081∗∗∗ 
(1.2434)
11.9535∗∗∗ 
(0.9038)
12.2179∗∗∗ 
(0.8146)
휃
2 11.0623∗∗∗ 
(1.3659)
10.5462∗∗∗ 
(1.1173)
11.0927∗∗∗ 
(0.9192)
12.1224∗∗∗ 
(1.1031)
12.6996∗∗∗ 
(0.8066)
12.9034∗∗∗ 
(0.6427)
12.1470∗∗∗ 
(1.2532)
13.5322∗∗∗ 
(0.9200)
13.3979∗∗∗ 
(0.8266)
휃
3 12.5366∗∗∗ 
(1.3851)
11.5389∗∗∗ 
(1.1315)
11.7420∗∗∗ 
(0.9281)
12.9535∗∗∗ 
(1.1077)
13.5271∗∗∗ 
(0.8134)
13.5911∗∗∗ 
(0.6497)
12.9361∗∗∗ 
(1.2622)
14.3575∗∗∗ 
(0.9301)
14.0369∗∗∗ 
(0.8362)
휃
4 12.8076∗∗∗ 
(1.3913)
12.4010∗∗∗ 
(1.1628)
12.4040∗∗∗ 
(0.9414)
13.4882∗∗∗ 
(1.1128)
14.1198∗∗∗ 
(0.8183)
14.0399∗∗∗ 
(0.6558)
13.3971∗∗∗ 
(1.2687)
14.8518∗∗∗ 
(0.9370)
14.5301∗∗∗ 
(0.8464)
휃
5 13.2525∗∗∗ 
(1.4046)
12.8682∗∗∗ 
(0.9553)
13.7733∗∗∗ 
(1.1167)
14.5594∗∗∗ 
(0.8234)
14.4434∗∗∗ 
(0.6619)
13.7292∗∗∗ 
(1.2736)
15.3122∗∗∗ 
(0.9451)
14.8930∗∗∗ 
(0.8543)
휃
6 13.8599∗∗∗ 
(1.4452)
13.0758∗∗∗ 
(0.9642)
14.1467∗∗∗ 
(1.1224)
14.8370∗∗∗ 
(0.8275)
14.6867∗∗∗ 
(0.6660)
14.0704∗∗∗ 
(1.2790)
15.7048∗∗∗ 
(0.9525)
15.3560∗∗∗ 
(0.8653)
휃
7 13.8986∗∗∗ 
(1.0352)
14.5345∗∗∗ 
(1.1283)
15.0485∗∗∗ 
(0.8308)
14.9144∗∗∗ 
(0.6704)
14.5103∗∗∗ 
(1.2869)
16.2177∗∗∗ 
(0.9606)
15.8401∗∗∗ 
(0.8756)
Observa-
tions
2787 2817 2829 2787 2817 2829 2787 2817 2829
Table 20  Per-firm entry 
thresholds from rural areas Pharmacies Physicians Dentists
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Threshold population per firm
s
1
2533 3552 2943 1706 1447 1307 2132 1770 2002
s
2
3613 5708 3375 1359 1053 1045 2651 2113 2058
s
3
6317 8022 3646 1524 1096 1052 2913 2219 2027
s
4
5656 11,498 4473 1597 1132 1034 2926 2186 2055
s
5
6053 5053 1527 1147 1054 2888 2253 2052
s
6
7504 4914 1607 1110 1016 2988 2331 2269
s
7
7764 1756 1066 999 3384 2651 2614
Per-firm entry threshold ratios ( s
7
∕sN)
s
7
∕s
1
2.96 3.24 2.64 1.03 0.74 0.76 1.59 1.50 1.31
s
7
∕s
2
2.08 2.01 2.30 1.29 1.01 0.96 1.28 1.26 1.27
s
7
∕s
3
1.18 1.43 2.13 1.15 0.97 0.95 1.16 1.19 1.29
s
7
∕s
4
1.33 1.74 1.10 0.94 0.97 1.16 1.21 1.27
s
7
∕s
5
1.24 1.54 1.15 0.93 0.95 1.17 1.18 1.27
s
7
∕s
6
1.58 1.09 0.96 0.98 1.13 1.14 1.15
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Table 21  Parameter estimates obtained from a non-spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010
All markets with more than seven firms are pooled in one category. Standard errors are in parenthesis
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicates that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
Number of 
firms
Pharmacies Physicians Dentists
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population 
(log) ( 훼)
1.6132∗∗∗ 
(0.0656)
1.4824∗∗∗ 
(0.0643)
1.4498∗∗∗ 
(0.0534)
1.6280∗∗∗ 
(0.0553)
1.8737∗∗∗ 
(0.0582)
1.6866∗∗∗ 
(0.0485)
1.6377∗∗∗ 
(0.0621)
1.8578∗∗∗ 
(0.0633)
1.7128∗∗∗ 
(0.0565)
Wages − 0.0079∗∗ 
(0.0040)
0.0003 
(0.0011)
0.0004 
(0.0005)
− 0.0014 
(0.0032)
− 0.0003 
(0.0010)
0.0008∗∗ 
(0.0004)
− 0.0006 
(0.0036)
0.0005 
(0.0010)
0.0008∗ 
(0.0004)
Unemploy-
ment (%)
0.0197∗ 
(0.0114)
0.0041 
(0.0071)
0.0181∗∗ 
(0.0077)
0.0215∗∗ 
(0.0093)
0.0243∗∗∗ 
(0.0054)
0.0265∗∗∗ 
(0.0059)
0.0248∗∗ 
(0.0104)
0.0171∗∗∗ 
(0.0059)
0.0310∗∗∗ 
(0.0070)
Young (%) − 2.2596 
(1.6685)
− 6.6865∗∗∗ 
(1.6631)
− 5.0409∗∗∗ 
(1.4641)
− 1.6654 
(1.3220)
− 6.6758∗∗∗ 
(1.1411)
− 4.9813∗∗∗ 
(0.9020)
− 4.6172∗∗∗ 
(1.5474)
− 6.4006∗∗∗ 
(1.2696)
− 5.6350∗∗∗ 
(1.2614)
Elderly (%) − 1.4115 
(1.5252)
− 2.9235∗ 
(1.6054)
2.3996∗ 
(1.3719)
− 0.4360 
(1.1958)
− 3.3008∗∗∗ 
(1.1438)
1.2100 
(0.9772)
− 2.9461∗∗ 
(1.4008)
− 3.7134∗∗∗ 
(1.3004)
− 0.1854 
(1.2967)
휃
1 10.3696∗∗∗ 
(1.3279)
10.2375∗∗∗ 
(0.9807)
11.7738∗∗∗ 
(0.7844)
11.6862∗∗∗ 
(1.0933)
12.0638∗∗∗ 
(0.7808)
12.5641∗∗∗ 
(0.6112)
11.1023∗∗∗ 
(1.2316)
12.3797∗∗∗ 
(0.8585)
13.0566∗∗∗ 
(0.7443)
휃
2 12.0096∗∗∗ 
(1.3427)
11.8328∗∗∗ 
(1.0004)
12.9130∗∗∗ 
(0.7984)
12.4350∗∗∗ 
(1.0968)
12.7603∗∗∗ 
(0.7862)
13.3492∗∗∗ 
(0.6171)
12.5568∗∗∗ 
(1.2414)
13.9597∗∗∗ 
(0.8742)
14.2284∗∗∗ 
(0.7569)
휃
3 13.2457∗∗∗ 
(1.3615)
12.6892∗∗∗ 
(1.0185)
13.5461∗∗∗ 
(0.8100)
13.2673∗∗∗ 
(1.1014)
13.5902∗∗∗ 
(0.7931)
14.0252∗∗∗ 
(0.6243)
13.3510∗∗∗ 
(1.2513)
14.7811∗∗∗ 
(0.8855)
14.8468∗∗∗ 
(0.7677)
휃
4 13.4883∗∗∗ 
(1.3665)
13.3139∗∗∗ 
(1.0327)
14.0006∗∗∗ 
(0.8230)
13.8033∗∗∗ 
(1.1068)
14.1855∗∗∗ 
(0.7984)
14.4629∗∗∗ 
(0.6307)
13.7908∗∗∗ 
(1.2578)
15.2781∗∗∗ 
(0.8943)
15.3229∗∗∗ 
(0.7796)
휃
5 14.2902∗∗∗ 
(1.3794)
13.7131∗∗∗ 
(1.0434)
14.2790∗∗∗ 
(0.8323)
14.0739∗∗∗ 
(1.1108)
14.6282∗∗∗ 
(0.8042)
14.8620∗∗∗ 
(0.6372)
14.0478∗∗∗ 
(1.2618)
15.7332∗∗∗ 
(0.9035)
15.6413∗∗∗ 
(0.7886)
휃
6 14.6314∗∗∗ 
(1.3853)
14.2960∗∗∗ 
(1.0610)
14.5468∗∗∗ 
(0.8410)
14.4343∗∗∗ 
(1.1169)
14.9126∗∗∗ 
(0.8089)
15.1085∗∗∗ 
(0.6417)
14.3427∗∗∗ 
(1.2668)
16.0474∗∗∗ 
(0.9101)
16.1030∗∗∗ 
(0.8017)
휃
7 14.5357∗∗∗ 
(1.0695)
14.8636∗∗∗ 
(0.8512)
14.8063∗∗∗ 
(1.1231)
15.1332∗∗∗ 
(0.8127)
15.3478∗∗∗ 
(0.6469)
14.6547∗∗∗ 
(1.2721)
16.3922∗∗∗ 
(0.9173)
16.4435∗∗∗ 
(0.8097)
Observa-
tions
2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926
Table 22  Per-firm entry 
thresholds from an ordinary 
ordered probit
Pharmacies Physicians Dentists
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Threshold population per firm
s
1
2448 3189 2761 1694 1443 1301 2092 1752 1966
s
2
3383 4676 3029 1342 1046 1036 2542 2051 1949
s
3
4853 5555 3125 1492 1086 1031 2752 2127 1864
s
4
4230 6351 3206 1555 1119 1002 2700 2085 1846
s
5
5564 6650 3108 1469 1134 1016 2527 2131 1779
s
6
5728 8211 3116 1527 1100 980 2522 2103 1941
s
7
8274 3323 1645 1061 968 2615 2170 2029
Per-firm entry threshold ratios ( s
7
∕sN)
s
7
∕s
1
2.34 2.59 1.20 0.97 0.74 0.74 1.25 1.24 1.03
s
7
∕s
2
1.69 1.77 1.10 1.23 1.01 0.93 1.03 1.06 1.04
s
7
∕s
3
1.18 1.49 1.06 1.10 0.98 0.94 0.95 1.02 1.09
s
7
∕s
4
1.35 1.30 1.04 1.06 0.95 0.97 0.97 1.04 1.10
s
7
∕s
5
1.03 1.24 1.07 1.12 0.94 0.95 1.03 1.02 1.14
s
7
∕s
6
1.01 1.07 1.08 0.96 0.99 1.04 1.03 1.05
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different data samples. The first (step 1) consists of rural 
areas only, while the second (step 2) includes all towns but 
does not allow for spatial spillovers.
In the first step, we re-estimate the model of entry using 
only towns with a population below 15,000 and a density 
below 800 inhabitants per km2 . This is motivated by the 
conjecture that large cities consist of overlapping markets, 
whereas rural areas are (more) isolated. Since this results in 
the removal of all large towns (regardless of their proximity 
to the observations in the sample), the model is estimated 
as a standard ordered probit model. The results are reported 
in Tables 19 and 20. 
Several observations are worth mentioning. Firstly, the 
exclusion of large towns leads to problems with the estima-
tion of the thresholds for markets with many firms, as these 
are rarely included in the sample. In particular, none of the 
towns in the sample have more than 4 pharmacies in 2001. 
This makes it difficult to directly compare the estimates 
across models. Nevertheless, the general conclusions of the 
estimation remain the same. In the pharmaceutical industry, 
entry barriers increase in 2001 but fall in 2010. In the case 
of physicians we observe a small decrease in the monopoly 
break-even population. The threshold for dentists appears 
to stagnate.
Secondly, the estimated thresholds ( 휃 ) and the resulting 
break-even population is consistently lower than the ones 
estimated in the spatial model. This is likely due to the 
fact that the spatial spillovers ( 휌 ) are negative. The nega-
tive spatial autocorrelation in profitability implies that if a 
specific local market A is surrounded by towns where entry 
of the first firm would be unprofitable (i.e. markets with no 
competitors), then the absence of neighbourhood competi-
tion would increase the pay-off of firms in market A. This 
in turn implies that certain towns with a small population 
will be able to attract an incumbent due to spillovers from 
similarly uncovered neighbouring units. Since the stand-
ard model cannot capture this effect, it underestimates the 
profitability of those markets and generates lower thresh-
old levels to accommodate the observed entry behaviour.
The conclusion that non-spatial models result in lower 
estimated entry thresholds is also confirmed when we 
use the full sample of towns (step 2). The estimates from 
these regressions are summarised in Tables 21 and 22. 
Once the full population of towns is taken into account, 
the threshold values move closer to those of the spatial 
model but still tend to be lower. Descriptive statistics 
detailing the distribution of population in our sample can 
be found in Table 23.    
Table 23  Descriptive statistics 
( N
1995
= 2843 , N
2001
= 2897 , 
N
2010
= 2926)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of pharmacies in 1995 0.30 1.97 0 77
Number of pharmacies in 2001 0.27 1.46 0 35
Number of pharmacies in 2010 0.51 3.14 0 81
Number of physicians in 1995 0.96 6.46 0 245
Number of physicians in 2001 2.01 11.50 0 347
Number of physicians in 2010 2.69 14.54 0 216
Number of dentists in 1995 0.59 4.41 0 169
Number of dentists in 2001 0.83 5.06 0 169
Number of dentists in 2010 0.87 4.81 0 85
Population in 1993 1878.77 10,964.59 13 452,253
Population in 2001 1871.84 7470.11 7 236,036
Population in 2010 1858.00 5973.80 12 111,800
Average nominal wage 1995 215.27 13.51 193 302
Average nominal wage 2001 363.16 42.13 294 657
Average nominal wage 2010 680.70 97.10 492 1327
Average unemployment rate in 1995 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.26
Average unemployment rate in 2001 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.35
Average unemployment rate in 2010 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.34
Share of population aged below 14 in 1993 0.21 0.05 0 0.51
Share of population aged below 14 in 2001 0.19 0.05 0 0.53
Share of population aged below 14 in 2010 0.16 0.05 0 0.69
Share of population aged above 60 in 1993 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.92
Share of population aged above 60 in 2001 0.23 0.07 0.02 0.89
Share of population aged above 60 in 2010 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.67
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